Right to Health in GATS: Can the Public Health Exception Pave the Way for Complementarity? by Gola, Swati
Pace International Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 1 Winter 2020 Article 3 
December 2020 
Right to Health in GATS: Can the Public Health Exception Pave the 
Way for Complementarity? 
Swati Gola 
University of Exeter, School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Health Services Administration Commons, International 
Law Commons, International Public Health Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Quality 
Improvement Commons, Tax Law Commons, and the Telemedicine Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Swati Gola, Right to Health in GATS: Can the Public Health Exception Pave the Way for 
Complementarity?, 33 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 75 (2020) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. 
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
 
75 
RIGHT TO HEALTH IN 
GATS:  
CAN THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH EXCEPTION 
PAVE THE WAY FOR 
COMPLEMENTARITY? 
Swati Gola* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  Introduction ...................................................................... 76 
II.  Services Having Implications for Health in GATs and 
the Right to Health ........................................................... 80 
A. Health Services under GATS .................................... 80 
B. A Hypothetical Scenario ............................................ 84 
III.  The Right to Health and the Public Exception in 
GATs .................................................................................. 90 
A. Methodology for Interpretation and VCLT 
Article 31(3)(c) ............................................................ 91 
B. The Three-Tiers Test to Justify the Public 
Health Measure ......................................................... 98 
1. Tier 1: The challenged measure aims to 
protect human life or health ................................. 99 
2. Tier 2: The challenged measure is ‘necessary’ .. 101 
3. Tier 3: Chapeau of article xiv and good faith .... 109 
IV.  Conclusion ....................................................................... 112 
 
* Lecturer, School of Law, University of Exeter. Swati’s keen interest in 
socio-legal implications of trade laws led to a PhD in the area of international 
trade in healthcare services and the right to health from University of Man-
chester. Swati is interested in assessing the impact of trade liberalization on 
human rights. She has written papers on intellectual property rights in India, 
Socio-Legal Implications of Reproductive Tourism in India and Medical Tour-
ism and Health Equity. 
1
76	 PACE	INT’L	L.	REV.	 Vol.	33.1	
I. INTRODUCTION 
The inclusion of health-related and other services impacting 
human health, such as sanitation, water, and environmental 
services, in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
has been met with vehement criticism and resistance.1  Despite 
the potential liberalization of health-related services to supple-
ment and complement World Trade Organization (WTO) Mem-
bers’ public health services through enhanced quality and effi-
ciency of supplies and increased foreign exchange earnings,2 
WTO Members have been reluctant to commit themselves to full 
liberalization in service sectors that have direct or indirect 
health implications.3  The low level of commitments, even after 
25 years of inception of GATS, are indicative of skepticism of 
whether liberalization of healthcare services through GATS re-
stricts the public health policies and affects the provision of 
healthcare services, which are pertinent for the right to health.  
It further indicates wariness that if a Member liberalizes ser-
vices in sectors that have implications for human health, it may 
lose the regulatory freedom to devise health policy measures 
 
1 See David Woodward, The GATS and Trade in Health Services: Implica-
tions for Health Care in Developing Countries, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 511, 
515–16 (2005); Allyson M. Pollock & David Price, The Public Health Implica-
tions of World Trade Negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices and Public Services, 362 LANCET 1072, 1072–73 (2003). 
2 David P. Fidler et al., Draft Legal Review of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) from a Health Policy Perspective ¶¶ 47–53 (2006) 
(working paper) (on file with the Globalization, Trade and Health Working Pa-
per Series); WHO & WTO, WTO AGREEMENTS & PUBLIC HEALTH: A JOINT STUDY 
BY THE WHO AND WTO SECRETARIAT 119–120 (2002).  
3 As of January 2000, less than 40% of WTO members had committed to 
liberalize health-related service sectors opposed to the 90% commitment in 
tourism and related services and the 70% commitment in financial services. 
Rudolf Adlung & Antonia Carzaniga, Health services under the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] 352, 353 
(2001), https://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/79(4)352.pdf?ua=1. As per this 
author’s collation of data based on WTO databases, as of January 2020, only 
49 of the 164 WTO members (counting the European Union Member States 
collectively) have made commitments in hospital services; of those, 23 Mem-
bers have also made commitments in other health human services, whereas 
only two Members have made commitments exclusively in other human health 
services. In terms of health-related professional services, only 52 WTO Mem-
bers have made commitments in medical and dental services and the number 
is even lower (22) for services provided by midwives, nurses, and physiothera-
pists.  
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/3
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according to their public health needs.4  The fundamental im-
portance of healthcare services and regulatory freedom to device 
public health policies is evident in the current Covid-19 pan-
demic.  For example, Spain chose to nationalize all its hospitals 
and healthcare services provision5 and the United Kingdom 
(UK), on the other hand, planned to rent private hospital beds 
in order to meet the demands of the pandemic.6 
 
The call for embracing the human rights agenda from 
within international trade law is not new.  After the Second 
World War, the two regimes, international human rights and in-
ternational trade law, seem to have evolved in isolation for “the 
lack of communication and dialogue between these two traits of 
liberalism . . . .”7  Scholarship exploring the tension between hu-
man rights and international trade and economic regulations 
followed.8  Former WTO director Pascal Lamy conceded that 
“trade and human rights go hand in hand, although progress 
still needs to be made to ensure better coherence between prin-
ciples and realities.”9  Several scholars have scoped the interna-
tional trade and human rights regimes, identifying areas of ten-
sion and means of possible reconciliation.10  Whereas some 
 
4 Adlung & Carzaniga, supra note 3, at 363. 
5 Jon Henley, Kim Willsher & Ashifa Kassam, Coronavirus: France im-
poses lockdown as EU calls for 30-day travel ban, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2020, 
3:52 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/16/coronavirus-
spain-takes-over-private-healthcare-amid-more-european-lockdowns. 
6 Nigel Nelson & Sean Rayment, Coronavirus: 8,000 private hospital beds 
rented to NHS for £2.4million per day, MIRROR (Mar. 15, 2020, 11:06 AM), 
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/coronavirus-nhs-steps-up-fight-
21694418?utm_source=linkCopy&utm_medium=social&utm_cam-
paign=sharebar. 
7 Thomas Cottier, Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover, 
5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 111, 113 (2002).  
8 See, e.g., Thomas G. Weiss, The United Nations: Before, During and After 
1945, 91 INT’L AFFAIRS 1221, 1227–28 (2015) (discussing the changes the 
United Nations undertook after World War II in response to the need for inter-
governmental organization).  
9 Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Speech to the United Nations In-
stitute for Training and Research: Trade and Human Rights Go Hand in Hand 
(Sept. 26, 2010). 
10 See, for example, Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, Human Rights and De-
velopment: A Comment on Challenges and Opportunities from a Legal Perspec-
tive, 1 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 51, 51–55, 66–67 (2009), for a discussion regarding 
the tension between human rights and international trade development, in-
cluding a demonstration on how “human rights could be integrated more 
3
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scholars built their thesis upon the values common to both re-
gimes,11 others identified methods to prevent or resolve any nor-
mative conflict through the application of rules of public inter-
national law,12 and some scholars even went on to claim that the 
WTO jurisprudence has already accommodated human rights 
into the utilitarian trade rules.13  However, as Howse and Teitel 
noted, it is imperative “to identify some fairly precise and specific 
interconnections between the legal concepts and doctrines in the 
treaty texts of both regimes.”14  Whereas the scholarship thus 
far has looked at human rights and international trade regimes 
in general and has attempted to identify how one can comple-
ment the other, this paper approaches this issue from the stand-
point of integrating a right to health measure in GATS compli-
ance through an interpretation of the public health exception 
under Article XIV(b).15 
 
systemically into development policy and practice.” 
11 See, for example, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations 
‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Or-
ganizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621, 621–
22 (2002), which promotes the integration of human rights and economic law, 
deviating from the one-sided focus on liberalization; and ROBERT HOWSE & RUTI 
G. TEITEL, BEYOND THE DIVIDE: THE COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 7 (2007), https://li-
brary.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04572.pdf, which suggests that the structure of 
a WTO treaty safeguards the consistency between economic goals and human 
purposes and intrinsic values.  
12 See, for example, Makau W. Mutua & Robert L. Howse, Protecting Hu-
man Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization 
53 (Buffalo Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 2010-008, 2010) in 2001 HUM. RTS. IN 
DEV. Y.B. 1999/2000 51–82 (Hugo Stokke & Anne Tostensen eds.) who contend 
that practices of inter-nation business must be held accountable to existing 
human rights law in addition to trade and investment agreements; and Gabri-
elle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
753, 753 (2002), who asserts that “WTO law must evolve and be interpreted 
consistently with international law, including human rights law.” 
13 See, for example, Stephen Joseph Powell, The Place of Human Rights 
Law in World Trade Organization Rules, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2004), which 
argues that the WTO has not only remained neutral as to human rights law, 
but also that decent progress has been made with regard to fitting the norms 
of human rights into the utilitarian trade rules; and M. Gregg Bloche, WTO 
Deference to National Health Policy: Towards An Interpretive Principle, 5 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 825, 826–27 (2002), which proposes that the WTO system al-
ready considers health as a de facto principle based on the weight accorded to 
health in prior trade disputes and the recognition of a “right to health.” 
14 HOWSE & TEITEL, supra note 11, at 7.  
15 See generally General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV(b), Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/3
2020	 Right	to	Health	in	GATs	 79	
 
This paper demonstrates how a right to health approach in 
the interpretation of the public health exception outlined in 
GATS Article XIV(b) can bring about a harmonious application 
of international human rights and international trade law re-
gimes.  Focusing on the interpretive value of the right to health 
for the public health exception in GATS, it examines whether a 
WTO Member, who has committed itself under GATS to fully 
liberalize all service sectors that have implications for health 
(e.g., hospital and other healthcare services), still retains the 
regulatory space to undertake measures to fulfill their right to 
health obligations and can justify a public health measure as in-
compatible with GATS obligations when undertaken to fulfill its 
right to health obligation.  This paper argues that a right to 
health approach to an interpretation of the public health excep-
tion in GATS can bring complementarity between international 
human rights and international trade law regimes.  A good faith 
and harmonious interpretation of the public health exception in 
GATS, taking into account the right to health, further advances 
systemic integration and responds to the challenge of fragmen-
tation of public international law. 
 
Specifically, the first part of this article introduces various 
services that have implications for human health, particularly 
health-related services, and illustrates how their regulation for 
right to health purposes may lead to a potential violation of 
GATS commitments.  The second part explores the general rule 
of treaty interpretation as a way to integrate the right to health 
in the public health exception.  Thereafter, this paper examines 
where and how the right to health can play an evidentiary and 
interpretive role in the three-tier test to be satisfied by the WTO 
Member raising the public health exception.  
 
The inquiry of this article is limited to the normative rela-
tionship between the right to health and the public health ex-
ception from the perspective of a WTO Member who is also a 
 
Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS] (“[N]othing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Mem-
ber of measures . . . necessary to protect human, animal or plant life, or health 
. . . .”). 
5
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State Party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  Since very few WTO Members 
have committed themselves to this area of trade,16 the discourse 
in this paper helps the responding Member by identifying poten-
tial legal strategies to strengthen the argument for the right to 
health interpretation of the health exception in GATS.  Given 
that the burden of proof lies on the State raising the health ex-
ception,17 it is judicious for health policy experts and Member 
States to formulate legal strategies to work within the interna-
tional legal framework that GATS and related rules of interna-
tional law create while responding to their public health needs. 
II. SERVICES HAVING IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH IN GATS AND 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH  
A. Health Services under GATS 
Several services included in GATS––hospital services, med-
ical and dental services, services provided by midwives, nurses 
and physiotherapists––have direct implications on human 
health, while others, environmental services, for example, have 
indirect implications on human health.18  GATS provides a flex-
ible legal framework for international trade in services wherein 
the services can be provided across States in four different ways, 
known as modes of supply: 
  
 
16 Health and social services, Current commitments and exemptions, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/health_social_e/health_so-
cial_e.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). 
17 WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GATS – ARTICLE XIV (JURISPRUDENCE) 
§ 1.4.4, ¶ 22, at 9 (2020), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publica-
tions_e/ai17_e/gats_art14_jur.pdf [hereinafter GATS ART. XIV JURIS.]. 
18 See WORLD BANK GROUP [WBG], INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN HEALTH 
SERVICES AND THE GATS: CURRENT ISSUES AND DEBATES 11 (Chantal Blouin, 
Nick Drager & Richard Smith eds., 2006). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/3
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TABLE 1: TRADE IN HEALTH-RELATED SERVICES VIA FOUR 
MODES OF DELIVERY19 
 
19 This table has been created by the author’s collation of data throughout 
her research for this paper.  
INTERNATION
AL TRADE IN 
HEALTH-
RELATED 
SERVICES 
MODE 1 
(CROSS-
BORDER 
TRADE) 
MODE 2 
(CONSUMPTI
ON ABROAD) 
MODE 3 
(COMMERCIA
L PRESENCE) 
MODE 4 
(MOVEMENT 
OF NATURAL 
PERSONS) 
HOW 
SERVICES 
ARE 
DELIVERED 
BOTH THE 
SERVICE 
PROVIDERS 
AND 
CONSUMERS 
DO NOT 
LEAVE THEIR 
RESPECTIVE 
COUNTRIES. 
CONSUMER 
PHYSICALLY 
TRAVELS 
FROM ONE 
COUNTRY TO 
ANOTHER TO 
OBTAIN A 
SERVICE. 
A SERVICE 
SUPPLIER 
OFFERS A 
SERVICE IN 
ANOTHER 
COUNTRY 
THROUGH, 
E.G., AN 
AGENCY, 
BRANCH, 
SUBSIDIARY 
OR JOINT 
VENTURE. 
PEOPLE 
TEMPORARILY 
ENTER 
ANOTHER 
COUNTRY IN 
ORDER TO 
PROVIDE A 
SERVICE. 
EXAMPLES TELEMEDICIN
E: A FOREIGN 
MEDICAL 
SPECIALIST 
SENDS 
ADVICE VIA 
INTERNET TO 
DOMESTIC 
DOCTORS OR 
HOSPITALS, 
E.G., TELE-
RADIOLOGY; 
TELE-
PATHOLOGY. 
MEDICAL 
TOURISM, 
WELLNESS 
TOURISM; 
PATIENTS 
SEEKING 
AFFORDABLE 
HIGH-
QUALITY 
TREATMENT 
OR 
ALTERNATIVE 
TREATMENT 
TRAVEL TO 
THE COUNTRY 
OF SERVICE 
PROVIDER. 
JOINT 
VENTURE 
BETWEEN 
FOREIGN AND 
DOMESTIC 
PARTNERS TO 
ESTABLISH A 
HOSPITAL, 
CLINIC OR 
DIAGNOSTIC 
FACILITY OR 
MANAGEMEN
T OF THESE 
FACILITIES. 
HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONA
LS (DOCTORS, 
NURSES, 
SPECIALISTS 
ETC.) AND 
SUPPORTING 
PERSONNEL 
MOVE 
OVERSEAS TO 
PROVIDE 
HEALTH 
RELATED 
SERVICES. 
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Some of the GATS obligations are horizontal in that they 
apply across all service sectors and in all modes of delivery 
whether or not a Member has liberalized that sector.20  Exam-
ples include Article II’s non-discrimination rule of most-favored-
nation,21 Article VIII’s competition principles on monopoly and 
exclusive service suppliers,22 and Article XIII’s government pro-
curement of services.23  On the other hand, specific obligations 
relating to market access and national treatment apply only 
when a Member wishes to liberalize a service sector and makes 
specific commitments in specific modes of delivery in that sec-
tor.24 
 
Some of the GATS obligations are horizontal in that they 
apply across all service sectors and in all modes of delivery 
whether or not a Member has liberalized that sector. he market 
access obligation requires a Member to accord foreign services 
and service supplier treatment under the terms, limitations, and 
conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.25  National treat-
ment requires that no measure, be it “in the form of a law, regu-
lation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any 
other form[,]”26 should “modif[y] the conditions of competition in 
favour of domestic services or service suppliers[,]”27 or act to the 
detriment of foreign “like services or service suppliers” unless 
such conditions are specified in the schedule of commitment.28  
 
 
20 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): objectives, cover-
age and discipline, 7. What are the basic obligations under GATS?, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm (last visited Nov. 
22, 2020). 
21 Article II of GATS: Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment (MFN obligation) 
requires a Member to treat all services and service suppliers equally regardless 
of country of ownership or origin, while also allowing Members to enter into 
Economic Integration Agreements or recognize the standards and regulations 
of one or more trading partners provided it fulfills certain conditions. See 
GATS, supra note 15, art. II. 
22 Id. art. VIII. 
23 Id. art. XIII. 
24 Id. arts. XI, XVII. 
25 Id. art. XVI(2). 
26 Id. art. XXVIII(a). 
27 Id. art. XVII(3); Woodward, supra note 1, at 513. 
28 GATS, supra note 15, art. XVII(1); Woodward, supra note 1, at 513. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/3
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When a Member makes a “full commitment” in both market 
access and national treatment, it commits itself not to impose 
any quantitative restriction on the foreign service providers, and 
to treat “like” foreign and domestic services and service suppli-
ers equally and not to introduce any measure that favors domes-
tic services or service suppliers.29  Therefore, if a WTO Member 
commits to fully liberalize a service sector that has implications 
on human health, it is then obliged to treat the foreign service 
suppliers like the domestic services suppliers.  The Member is 
further obliged to give the foreign service suppliers full access to 
its domestic market without any of the quantitative restrictions 
listed in Article XVI(2), which requires Members not to: 
 
1. Limit the number of service providers;30 
2. Limit the value of service transactions;31  
3. Limit the total number of service operations or total 
quantity of service output;32  
4. Limit the number of natural persons employed in a 
particular service sector;33  
5. Take measures that restrict or require specific types 
of permissible legal entities;34 and  
6. Limit the participation of foreign capital.35 
 
At the same time, the aforementioned services’ resulting im-
plications on human health, particularly health-related services, 
are crucial for the maintenance of a functioning and affordable 
public health system mandated by the right to health obliga-
tion.36  According to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (CESCR), a State Party to ICESCR is under a legal 
 
29 GATS, supra note 15, arts. II, XVII. 
30 Id. art. XVI(2)(a). 
31 Id. art. XVI(2)(b). 
32 Id. art. XVI(2)(c). 
33 Id. art. XVI(2)(d). 
34 Id. art. XVI(2)(e). 
35 Id. art. XVI(2)(f). 
36 General Comment No. 14: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implemen-
tation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts. on Its Twenty-Second Session, April 25–
May 12, 2000, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) [hereinafter General Com-
ment No. 14]. 
9
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obligation to provide sufficient as well as functioning public 
healthcare facilities, goods, and services that include not only 
hospitals, clinics, other health-related buildings, adequately 
qualified and trained medical professionals, and essential drugs, 
but also the basic necessities for good health such as safe and 
potable drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities.37  
Subsequently, a State party to both the WTO and the ICESCR 
is faced with the challenging task of balancing the seemingly 
competing obligations arising from the respective international 
legal regimes. 
B. A Hypothetical Scenario 
By way of illustration, let us imagine that a WTO Member, 
Country X, has fully liberalized the healthcare services sector 
and, as such, is now obligated to grant full market access to for-
eign hospitals and other health-related service providers and 
treat them “like” domestic hospitals and other health-related 
services providers.  Consequently, foreign healthcare service 
providers have established tele-medicine and tele-pathology ser-
vices, as well as opened tertiary hospitals, providing ambulatory 
and inpatient care in Country X.  Because Country X is also a 
party to ICESCR, it is bound to provide functioning public hos-
pitals and other health-related services, including medical ser-
vices. 
 
To begin with, not every public health measure necessarily 
violates GATS obligations.  For example, let us imagine that 
Country X provides certain subsidies to strengthen the financial 
support to its public sector hospitals.  This measure does not vi-
olate Country X’s GATS obligations since there is no GATS pro-
vision prohibiting subsidies in the service sector.  Moreover, ser-
vices are excluded from the scope of the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, which specifically 
prohibits trade-distorting subsidies by WTO Members.38  The 
SCM Agreement expressly refers to the purchases of goods but 
 
37 Id. ¶ 11. 
38 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 3, Dec. 31, 
1999, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/3
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omits reference to the purchase of services.39  Acknowledging the 
trade-distortive effect of subsidies in certain circumstances, Ar-
ticle XV of GATS provides for further negotiations to develop 
necessary multilateral disciplines.40  “However, [currently], no 
concrete proposals have been submitted to date in the negotia-
tions under Article XV.”41  As it stands, a Member which consid-
ers itself to be adversely affected by another Member’s measure 
may request a consultation with that Member,42 but “[w]ithin 
the Agreement’s current structure, it would not be possible to 
challenge such measures” granting subsidies.43   Thus, if the fi-
nancial support to its public health sector by Country X is 
deemed trade-distortive by another Member, the only means of 
recourse available to the affected Member is to request a consul-
tation.  
 
As noted earlier, GATS Article XVI sets out specific obliga-
tions for Members that have undertaken specific market access 
commitments in their schedules.44  Article XVI(1) specifically 
obliges Members to accord services and service suppliers of other 
Members “no less favourable treatment than that provided for 
under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified 
in its Schedule.”45  The Appellate Body (AB) in United States—
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services (US—Gambling II) emphasized that a full mar-
ket access commitment given in a particular sector or sub-sector 
extends to the whole of that sector, including all of its sub-sec-
tors.46  Similarly, a full market access commitment given for sup-
ply of a service applies to any means of delivery included in Mode 
 
39 Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶ 7.968, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/R (adopted Mar. 
23, 2012). 
40 GATS, supra note 15, art. XV(1). 
41 Rudolf Adlung, Public Services and the GATS, 27 (WTO Staff Working 
Paper No. ERSD-2005-039, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=922256. 
42 GATS, supra note 15, art. XV(2). 
43 Adlung, supra note 41, at 26. 
44 GATS, supra note 15, art. XVI(2)(a)–(f). 
45 Id. art. XVI(1). 
46 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 219, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter US–Gambling II]. 
11
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1––i.e., cross-border supply of services via telecommunication.47  
 
Suppose that in order to tackle the issue of brain drain,48 or 
to ensure that there are enough doctors and nurses in the public 
sector hospitals, Country X has decided to limit the number of 
medical practitioners––such as doctors, nurses and clinicians––
in the private sector hospitals for both domestic and foreign sub-
sidiaries.  Because Country X did not specify any limitations in 
its schedule of commitments, its GATS obligation does not allow 
it to apply any quantitative restrictions.49  It is required under 
GATS Article XVI(2)(d) not to limit “the total number of natural 
persons that may be employed in a particular service sector or 
that a service supplier may employ and who are necessary for, 
and directly related to, the supply of a specific service” unless it 
is specified in its schedule.50  Medical professionals, including 
doctors, nurses, clinicians, paramedical staff, patient attend-
ants, and medical lab technicians are natural persons necessary 
and directly related to supply of hospital services.51  Since Article 
XVI(2)(d) specifically prohibits quantitative limitations on “the 
total number of natural persons”52 that may be employed in a 
service sector or by a service supplier, the public health measure 
to restrict the number of medical practitioners in the private sec-
tor hospitals is inconsistent with the market access commitment 
undertaken by Country X. 
 
Whereas market access obligation under GATS Article 
XVI(2) applies to six quantitative measures identified therein,53 
the national treatment measure extends generally to “all 
 
47 Id. ¶ 220. 
48 See Rep. of the High Comm’r on Liberalization of Trade in Services and 
Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts. on 
Its Fifty-Fourth Session, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (2002), for a dis-
cussion on brain drain, i.e., where scarce human resources, like trained medi-
cal professionals, move to the private sector for better remuneration and infra-
structures to the detriment of the poor. 
49 See GATS, supra note 15, art. XX. 
50 Id. art. XVI(2)(d). 
51 See Rupa Chanda, Trade in Health Services, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. 158, 159 (2001).  
52 GATS, supra note 15, art. XVI(2)(d). 
53 Id. art. XVI(2)(a)–(d). 
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measures affecting the supply of services.”54  Suppose that Coun-
try X imposes a differential taxation system where a specific tax 
is imposed only on private health services providers (i.e., private 
sector hospitals, tele-medicine services, tele-pathology/radiology 
services) for both domestic and foreign subsidiaries in order to 
generate revenues to fund the public sector hospital services 
which cater to the healthcare needs of the poor population at a 
very nominal cost.  At first glance, it may be argued that there 
is no violation of a national treatment commitment by Country 
X since it applies to both domestic and foreign private hospitals 
alike and public services are exempted in GATS.  However, the 
scope of GATS is very wide as the Agreement applies to any 
measures taken by the government at any level––central, re-
gional or local––including the measures taken by non-govern-
mental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by any of these 
governmental authorities,55 having an effect on trade in service 
in “any service in any sector.”56  
 
Although “service[s] supplied in the exercise of governmen-
tal authority” are excluded, they ought not to be supplied on a 
commercial basis or in competition with one or more service sup-
pliers.57  Given the textual ambiguities and interpretive contro-
versy regarding the meaning of “governmental authority,” “com-
mercial basis,” or “competition,” it is not clear whether the 
supply of healthcare services at a very low subsidized rate would 
fall within the sectoral scope of GATS.58  The mere fact that the 
services are provided for a fee, no matter how nominal or no-
tional, would likely classify them as being provided on a com-
mercial basis.  Since the public hospitals in Country X provide 
services at a nominal cost, they are not exempt from the appli-
cation of GATS rules.  Since Country X is obligated not to dis-
criminate between domestic and foreign services and service 
suppliers, the question is whether domestic public hospital 
 
54 Panel Report, China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment 
Services, ¶ 7.652, WTO Doc. WT/DS413/R (adopted Aug. 31, 2012) [hereinafter 
China–Electronic Payment Services]. 
55 GATS, supra note 15, art. I(3)(a)(i), (ii). 
56 Id. art. I(3)(b); Adlung, supra note 41, at 6. 
57 GATS, supra note 15, art. I(3)(c). 
58 See Markus Krajewski, Public Services and Trade Liberalization: Map-
ping the Legal Framework, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 341, 351–53 (2003). 
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services are “like” foreign private hospital services.  To this end, 
the “likeness” analysis is crucial to determining whether Coun-
try X has acted inconsistently with the non-discrimination obli-
gations under the WTO. 
 
The “likeness” analysis under GATS includes “considera-
tions relating to both the service[s] and the service supplier[s] . 
. . .”59  In Argentina—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and 
Services (Argentina—Financial Services), the AB noted that the 
criteria for assessing “likeness” in the context of trading goods, 
including that consumers’ tastes and habits or consumers’ per-
ceptions and behaviors with respect to the products, may also be 
employed in assessing “likeness” in the context of services, pro-
vided that they are adapted to the specific characteristics of the 
trade in services.60  Accordingly, a test of “likeness” or “substi-
tutability” to services implies a determination of whether the 
service consumer considers the services or service suppliers to 
be descriptively identical and/or directly substitutable.61  The AB 
observed that an analysis of the nature and extent of a competi-
tive relationship is an essential prerequisite for a “likeness” 
analysis.62  Where the services are determined to be “essentially 
or generally the same in competitive terms, those services [are 
found to] be ‘like’ for purposes of GATS Article XVII.”63  In most 
States, health-related services, such as hospital services and di-
agnostic or laboratory services, are increasingly provided by 
both public and private sector service providers on a user-fee ba-
sis where the service consumers choose the services on the basis 
of availability, quality, price, portability of medical insurance, 
and ability to move freely between the two sectors.64  
 
 
59 Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Measures Relating to Trade in 
Goods and Services, ¶ 6.29, WTO Doc. WT/DS453/12 (adopted May 9, 2016) 
[hereinafter Argentina–Financial Services]. 
60 Id. ¶¶ 6.30–6.33. 
61 Fidler et al., supra note 2, ¶ 101.  
62 Argentina–Financial Services, supra note 59, ¶¶ 6.31–6.32.  
63 China–Electronic Payment Services, supra note 54, ¶ 7.702. 
64 See, e.g., Roosa Tikkanen, et al., International Health Care System Pro-
files: United States, COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 5, 2020), https://www.com-
monwealthfund.org/international-health-policy-center/countries/united-states 
(discussing the mixed public and private health system used in the United 
States).  
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss1/3
2020	 Right	to	Health	in	GATs	 89	
In the healthcare services market of Country X, public hos-
pital services, provided for on a user-fee basis, coexist with pri-
vate hospital services.  Since the determination of “likeness” de-
pends on the degree of competitiveness and substitutability,65 
application of “consumer perception,” “properties, nature and 
quality,” “end-use” and “substitutability” criterion set out by the 
Panel in European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC—Asbestos),66 will result 
in a finding of direct “competitive relationship” and “likeness” 
between the domestic public sector hospitals and the foreign pri-
vate sector hospitals.  Following the Panel’s reasoning in Euro-
pean Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Dis-
tribution of Bananas (EC—Bananas I), where “each of the 
different service activities taken individually is virtually the 
same . . . to the extent that the entities provide these like ser-
vices, they are like service suppliers[,]”67 domestic public hospi-
tal services providers are “like” foreign private hospital services 
providers.  Thus, it is more than likely that, if disputed, the dif-
ferential tax measure by Country X to finance its public hospital 
services will be deemed to violate the national treatment obliga-
tion of GATS.  
 
Nonetheless, as the Panel in China—Certain Measures Af-
fecting Electronic Payment Services (China—Electronic Payment 
Services) noted: 
[E]ven if relevant services are determined to be “like” and a meas-
ure of a Member is found to result in less favourable treatment of 
“like” services of another Member, it may still be possible to justify 
that measure under one of the general exceptions set out in Article 
XIV of the GATS.68   
 
These exceptions, inter alia, affirm a Member’s right to take 
 
65 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affect-
ing Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 98–99, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001) [hereinafter EC–Asbestos]. 
66 Id. ¶¶ 99, 101. 
67 Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 7.322, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/ECU 
(adopted Sept. 25, 1997). 
68 China–Electronic Payment Services, supra note 54, at 179 n.895. 
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measures for the protection of human life or health.  This obser-
vation is in line with the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) Panel determination in 1987 in Japan—Customs 
Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and 
Alcoholic Beverages (Japan—Alcoholic Beverages).69  In that 
case, while discussing Japan’s claim that discriminatory or pro-
tective taxes on various alcoholic beverages could be justified as 
designed to meet the objective of taxation, the Panel noted that 
“[t]he ‘general exceptions’ provided for in GATT Article XX 
might also justify internal tax differentiations among like or di-
rectly competitive products, for instance if ‘necessary to protect 
human . . . life or health[’] (Article XX(b)).”70  Therefore, even if 
the public health measures are found to be inconsistent with its 
market access and national treatment obligations, Country X 
can justify these measures on the basis of the public health ex-
ception under GATS to which we turn now.  
III. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AND THE PUBLIC EXCEPTION IN 
GATS  
Recognizing the importance of certain non-trade interests 
and obligations for a State, the general exception clause––Arti-
cle XIV––“affirm[s] the right of Members to pursue various reg-
ulatory objectives identified [therein] even if, in doing so, Mem-
bers act inconsistently with [the] obligations set out in the . . . 
Agreement[ ].”71  The AB in Argentina—Financial Services af-
firmed a Member’s right to pursue national policy objectives as 
recognized in the preamble of GATS,72 which covers a wide array 
of objectives, and Members retain the right to use various means 
to pursue these objectives.73  “Through these . . . exceptions, the 
 
69 See Report of the Panel, Japan—Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling 
Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 5.11, L/6216 (Nov. 10, 
1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.), at 83 (1987). 
70 Id. ¶ 5.13. 
71 Argentina–Financial Services, supra note 59, ¶ 6.113; see also GATS, 
supra note 15, art. XIV.  
72 Argentina–Financial Services, supra note 59, ¶¶ 6.87–6.93 (“In the 
Panel’s view, Members’ right to regulate the supply of services to meet national 
policy objectives, ‘as enshrined in the preamble to the GATS,’ confirms the rel-
evance of the regulatory framework in the context of trade services.”). 
73 See GATS, supra note 15, pmbl. (“Recognizing the right of Members to 
regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services within 
their territories in order to meet national policy objectives and, given 
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GATS seeks to strike a balance between a Member’s obligations 
assumed under the Agreement and that Member’s right to pur-
sue national policy objectives.”74  It is important to note that the 
pursuit of a Member’s national policy objective does not neces-
sarily involve a breach of its GATS obligations.75  Therefore, un-
less the measure imposed is in inconsistent with its GATS obli-
gations—i.e., modifies the conditions of competition to the 
detriment of like services or service suppliers of another Mem-
ber—the Member imposing that measure would not need to in-
voke any exceptions.76  For example, if the differential tax meas-
ure of Country X does not modify the conditions of competition 
to the detriment of foreign hospital services and service suppli-
ers, it would not need to invoke the exception.  In terms of health 
policy, as well as the right to health measures, Article XIV(b) is 
most relevant for our analysis as it provides an exception for 
non-compliant measures that are “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health[.]”77  It is in the interpretation of 
the public health exception that the right to health can provide 
interpretive and evidentiary value as the following discussion 
demonstrates. 
A. Methodology for Interpretation and VCLT Article 31(3)(c) 
In accordance with Article 3(2) of the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding, Dispute Settlement Bodies (DSBs) can 
only apply WTO Agreements to disputes, and those Agreements 
are nonetheless to be interpreted “in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law.”78  “Interpre-
tation is the very first technique [used by] international judge[s] 
. . . to ensure the consistency of the rules which [they] appl[y].”79  
 
asymmetries existing with respect to the degree of development of services reg-
ulations in different countries, the need of particular developing countries to 
exercise this right . . . .”). 
74 Argentina—Financial Services, supra note 59, ¶ 6.114. 
75 See id. ¶ 6.117. 
76 See id. 
77 See GATS supra note 15, art. XIV(b). 
78 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, art. 3(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU 
Agreement]. 
79 Jean d’Aspremont, Articulating International Human Rights and Inter-
national Humanitarian Law: Conciliatory Interpretation under the Guise of 
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As the ICJ stated in the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory 
case, “[i]t is a rule of interpretation that a text emanating from 
a Government must, in principle, be interpreted as producing 
and as intended to produce effects in accordance with existing 
law and not in violation of it.”80  The act of interpretation thus 
entails the act of selecting the pertinent meaning from the pleth-
ora of potentially different meanings. 
 
The scope of possible meanings of the words are restricted 
by Article 3(2) since “the DSB cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.”81  
However, the general rule of interpretation, as set forth in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),82  provides a 
pathway to integrate the right to health in the interpretation of 
the general exceptions clauses in WTO Agreements.83  
 
It is true that right to health is not a part of the applicable 
law in WTO dispute settlement, nor can a defense against the 
claim of a violation of GATS be based solely on the right to 
health, yet the right to health can be raised in the argument 
when interpreting the public health exception in GATS.84  More-
over, interpretation does not “add” anything to the instrument 
being interpreted but instead constructs the meaning by a legal 
technique that takes into account other institutional and norma-
tive contexts.85  Indeed, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has noted that “general excep-
tion clauses provide a mechanism to raise  human rights argu-
ment within WTO . . . [and] are thus a means of ensuring WTO 
law can be interpreted and implemented with due regard for 
 
Conflict of Norms-Resolution, in THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
3, 6 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos Merkouris eds., 2013).  
80 Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Preliminary Ob-
jections, 1957 I.C.J. 125, 142 (Nov. 26).  
81 DSU Agreement, supra note 78, art. 3(2). 
82 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
83 See Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Human Rights and 
World Trade Agreements: Using General Exception Clauses to Protect Human 
Rights, at 4–5, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/05/5 (2005) [hereinafter OHCHR].  
84 Id. at 6–8. 
85 Id. at 4–5. 
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international human rights norms . . . .”86 
 
In assessing the potential role of the right to health in the 
interpretation of the public health exception in GATS, Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT is of particular importance.  It states that 
“[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the rela-
tions between the parties” must be taken into account.87  Ad-
vancing one of the earliest and most fundamental principles of 
international law—pacta sunt servanda—Article 31(3)(c), thus, 
places “treaty interpretation against the whole background of 
international law.”88  The phrase “any relevant rules of interna-
tional law” provides wide authority “to examine public interna-
tional law sources.”89  These relevant rules assist in interpreta-
tion of the treaty terms by providing “a contemporary 
interpretation of the ordinary meaning of a term.”90  The absence 
of any restrictions, and the use of the word “any” in general, 
gives a wide meaning to the phrase “any relevant rules” and 
must be taken to refer to any recognized source of international 
law that can be of assistance in the process of interpretation.91  
“[C]orrespond[ing] with the notion of sources of international 
law as in Article 38 para. 1 of the ICJ-Statute92 . . . [the applica-
ble rules] . . . may be general, regional or local customary rules, 
as well as bilateral or multilateral treaties, and even general 
principles of international law” so long as they are in force at the 
time of treaty interpretation.93  Consequently, “in the interpre-
tation of WTO provisions, Art. 31(3)(c) directs [WTO] panels and 
the Appellate Body to take account of [all WTO] treaty 
 
86 Id. at 3. 
87 VCLT, supra note 82, art. 31(3)(c).  
88 MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF TREATIES 432 (2009).  
89 Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: 
The Relationship Between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties, 
35 J. WORLD TRADE 1081, 1087 (2001). 
90 VILLIGER, supra note 88, at 432. 
91 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 549 (Oli-
ver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012) [hereinafter VCLT 
COMMENTARY]. 
92 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
93 VILLIGER, supra note 88, at 433. 
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provisions” as well as human rights law.94  As the International 
Law Commission stated, all international law exists in a sys-
temic relationship with other law, and, accordingly, a tribunal 
“must always interpret and apply that instrument in its relation-
ship to its normative environment - that is to say ‘other’ interna-
tional law.”95  Referring to the international legal system as a 
whole as part of the context of every treaty concluded under in-
ternational law, Article 31(3)(c) lays the foundation for “the sys-
temic approach to treaty interpretation.”96  Article 31(3)(c) is 
thus as an expression of the principle of “systemic integration,”97 
where all treaty rights and obligations exist alongside rights and 
obligations established by other treaty provisions, and the rules 
of customary international law and their relationship is ap-
proached through a process of reasoning that “makes them ap-
pear as parts of some coherent and meaningful whole.”98  The 
principle of systemic integration points to the need to take the 
wider normative environment into account, which means that 
specific norms must be read against other norms bearing upon 
those same facts as the treaty under interpretation.99  Using this 
principle in treaty interpretation “achieve[s] . . . harmonisation 
of rules of international law.”100  The right to health provides the 
wider normative environment that the principle of systemic 
 
94 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 254–55 
(2003). 
95 International Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of Int’l Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of Int’l Law—Report of the 
Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 423, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 
2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter ILC Study Group Re-
port].  
96 VCLT COMMENTARY, supra note 91, at 553. 
97 ILC Study Group Report, supra note 95, ¶ 413; see generally RICHARD 
K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 299–314  (2d ed. 2015); Campbell 
McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(C) of the 
Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COM L. Q. 279 (2005); Panos Merkouris, Article 
31(3)(c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration, in 17 QUEEN MARY 
STUDIES IN INT’L LAW SERIES 13–101 (2015); and Christian Djeffal, Static and 
Evolutive Treaty Interpretation: A Functional Reconstruction, in 124 
CAMBRIDGE STUD. IN INT’L AND COMPAR. L SERIES 167–170 (2016), for commen-
tary on Article 31(3)(c) particularly in the context of systemic integration. 
98 ILC Study Group Report, supra note 95, ¶ 414. 
99 Id. ¶¶ 415–16. 
100 McLachlan, supra note 97, at 318. 
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integration points to in the context of treaty interpretation.101  
Since the public health measures of Country X—that are to be 
justified under Article XIV(b)—do have a bearing on the right to 
health obligation of Country X, a right to health-based interpre-
tation of the public health exception for justification of the public 
health measures undertaken by Country X follows the principle 
of integration.  
 
The question arises as to which “other” rules of interna-
tional law are considered “applicable in the relations between 
the parties” when the composition of membership does not 
match between different treaty regimes.102  For example, in EC–
Bananas II, the Appellate Body reviewed the Lomè Convention 
in its interpretation of the Lomè waiver incorporated within 
GATT 1994, which was concerned with special rights and obli-
gations of a group of WTO Members.103  This ruling demon-
strates a willingness by the DSBs to consider non-WTO agree-
ments that it deemed “applicable in the relations between the 
parties” in order to resolve a dispute.104  On the other hand, the 
panel in European Communities–Measures Affecting the Ap-
proval and Marketing of Biotech Products (EC–Biotech) nar-
rowly interpreted “applicable in the relations between the par-
ties” to exclude the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity and the 
2000 Biosafety Protocol from consideration.105  The Panel ulti-
mately held that only those rules which are applicable in the re-
lations between WTO Members are to be taken into account 
when interpreting WTO agreements.106  This narrow interpreta-
tion of “parties” would imply all WTO Members.107  Given that 
WTO membership extends to non-sovereign members, for exam-
ple, the EU, “it cannot possibly have exactly the same 
 
101 See id. at 282. 
102 Id. at 313–14. 
103 Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Regime For the Impor-
tation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶¶ 179–88, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted Sept. 25, 1997). 
104 See id. 
105 Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting the Ap-
proval and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶¶ 7.68–7.75, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS291/R (adopted Nov. 21, 2006). 
106 Id. ¶ 7.71. 
107 Id. ¶ 7.68. 
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membership as any other international treaty.”108  
 
To require a non-WTO rule, used to interpret WTO obliga-
tions, to have identical membership, or at least WTO member-
ship, would therefore frustrate the application of the principle of 
systemic integration.109  This narrow approach to the interpre-
tation of “applicable in the relations between the parties” in Ar-
ticle 31(3)(c) has not only been rejected by the ILC but also by 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).110  The ILC noted that 
“the unlikeness of a precise congruence in the membership of . . 
. multilateral conventions [will make it] unlikely that any use of 
conventional international law could be made in the interpreta-
tion of such conventions[,]” which is “contrary to the legislative 
ethos behind most of multilateral treaty-making and, presuma-
bly, with the intent of most treaty-makers.”111  In the Legal Con-
sequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970) opinion, the ICJ observed that “an international instru-
ment has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of 
the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpreta-
tion.”112  Later, in the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ once again held 
that “[t]he court cannot accept that [a specific treaty rule] was 
intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant rules 
of international law[;]” thus, making the application of the rele-
vant rules of international law an integral part of the task of 
interpretation entrusted to the Court.113  The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), too, has freely “drawn from the interna-
tional normative environment” in interpreting the European 
Convention on Human Rights.”114 
 
 
108 OHCHR, supra note 83, at 8. 
109 See Marceau, supra note 12, at 781. 
110 HOWSE & TEITEL, supra note 11, at 7. 
111 ILC Study Group Report, supra note 95, ¶ 471. 
112 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Af-
rica in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Ad-
visory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 53 (June 21). 
113 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 41 (Nov. 6). 
114 For additional cases from the European Court of Human Rights, see 
Jean-Marc Sorel & Valérie Boré Eveno, Interpretation of Treaties, 1969 Vienna 
Convention: Article 31, in 1 THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
804, 828 & n.154 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011). 
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The AB in US–Gasoline II made it clear that the WTO 
Agreement “is not to be read in clinical isolation from public in-
ternational law[,]”115 thus, fulfilling its obligation to take into ac-
count “any relevant rules of international law applicable . . . be-
tween the parties.”116  A broad reading of “between the parties” 
does not restrict the application of international law to only 
when it applies to all WTO Members.117  This approach was 
adopted by the AB in United States–Import of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products (US–Shrimps), which examined the use of 
the term “natural resources” in a number of multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements, including the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species 1973.118  The AB did not re-
fer to all the parties, and the fact that not all the disputants 
ratified or signed these conventions did not pose any prob-
lems.119  Similarly, references to a number of Regional and Bilat-
eral Trade Agreements were made in the AB Report on United 
States–Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”: Re-
course to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities 
(US–FSC) to interpret “foreign-source income” in the context of 
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.120  
Therefore, the interpretation of “the parties” as referring to a 
large number of WTO Members is in line with the WTO juris-
prudence.  Given that 84% of WTO Members are also bound by 
the ICESCR obligations, the right to health can be seen as a rel-
evant rule of international law applicable in the relations be-
tween the parties.121 
 
115 Appellate Body Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, 17, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted May 20, 
1996) [hereinafter US–Gasoline II]. 
116 OHCHR, supra note 83, at 5. 
117 Id. at 8. 
118 Appellate Body Report, United States–Import of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 25, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) [here-
inafter US–Shrimps]. 
119 See Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate 
Body, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 605, 608 (2010).  
120 Appellate Body Report, United States–Tax Treatment for “Foreign 
Sales Corporations”: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Com-
munities, ¶¶ 141–45 & n.123, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/RW (adopted Jan. 29, 
2002). 
121 Holger P. Hestermeyer, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the 
World Trade Organization: Legal Aspects and Practice, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND 
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B. The Three-Tiers Test to Justify the Public Health Measure 
The DSBs have repeatedly acceded that protection of hu-
man life and health is both vital and of “highest importance”122 
and that “[m]embers have the right to determine the level of pro-
tection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situ-
ation.”123  Given the textual similarities between GATT Article 
XX and GATS Article XIV, the AB in US–Gambling II  found the 
case law of GATT Article XX to be relevant for the analysis un-
der GATS Article XIV.124  Consequently, GATT jurisprudence on 
Article XX is important for analyzing and interpreting GATS Ar-
ticle XIV(b); 125 especially, for the lack of GATS case-law analyz-
ing the public health exception.126  
 
The burden of proof that is necessary to establish that the 
challenged measure meets all the requirements of the exception 
lies with the Member that invoked an exception clause to justify 
its measure that would otherwise violate the GATS obligation.127  
Therefore, if challenged, the onus to prove that its public health 
measures are justified under GATS Article XIV(b) lies with 
Country X in the previous scenario, requiring it to satisfy a 
three-tiered test developed by the Panel in United States–Stand-
ards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US–Gasoline 
I).128  The impugned measure must first pursue one of the policy 
objectives outlined in the exceptions; “second, the impugned 
measure must be ‘necessary’ to achieve” that policy objective; 
 
CHALLENGES 260, 264 (Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca, & Chrisophe Golay eds., 
2014). 
122 See, e.g., Panel Report, Indonesia–Measures Concerning the Importa-
tion of Chicken Meat and Chicken Products, ¶ 7.225, WTO Doc. WT/DS484/R 
(adopted Nov. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Indonesia–Chicken]; Appellate Body Re-
port, Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 179, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil–Retreaded Tyres]. 
123 EC–Asbestos, supra note 65, ¶ 168. 
124 US–Gambling II, supra note 46, ¶ 291. 
125 Fidler et al., supra note 2, ¶ 466. 
126 See id. ¶ 465. 
127 GATS ART. XIV JURIS., supra note 17, ¶ 22. 
128 Panel Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, ¶ 6.20, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R (adopted May 20, 1996) [herein-
after US–Gasoline I]. Although the dispute related to the health exception in 
GATT Article XX(b), the test prescribed is relevant for analysis of GATS Article 
XX(b), following the Appellate Body’s reasoning in US–Gambling II, supra note 
46, ¶¶ 283–84. 
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and finally, “the impugned measure must satisfy the require-
ments of the ‘chapeau,’” which would be the opening clause, of 
Article XIV.129  Since Country X is a WTO Member and also a 
State Party to the ICESCR, it would be contextually relevant for 
the DSB to examine the relationship between the challenged 
measure and the WTO Member’s health policy objectives by ref-
erence to the WTO Member’s obligations to respect, protect, and 
realize progressively “to the maximum of its available re-
sources,”130 “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.”131  
1. Tier 1: The challenged measure aims to protect human life or 
health 
Country X would first need to show that its non-complying 
public health measures fall within Article XIV(b), that is, that 
the measure relates to the protection of human, animal, and 
plant life or health.132  The Panel in EC–Asbestos followed the 
approach in US–Gasoline I to first examine whether the Euro-
pean Communities measure was designed to protect human 
health, i.e., the measure is designed to achieve a health objec-
tive.133  In European Communities–Conditions for the Granting 
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (EC–Tariff Prefer-
ences), the Panel held that European Communities’ Drug Ar-
rangements failed to establish the link between the market ac-
cess improvement and the protection of human health in the 
European Communities.134  Thus, Country X will first need to 
prove that its measures restricting the number of medical prac-
titioners in the private sector and the differential tax measures 
are aimed at the protection of public health.  
 
 
129 SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 107 
(2011).  
130 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 2, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1996) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2200A–
ICESCR].  
131 Id. art. 12(1). 
132 See GATS, supra note 15, art. XIV(b). 
133 EC–Asbestos, supra note 65, ¶ 8.184. 
134 Panel Report, European Communities–Conditions for the Granting of 
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶ 7.206–7.207, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS246/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter EC–Tariff Preferences]. 
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The terms “to protect” and “human life or health” in their 
ordinary meanings are very broad and have considerable poten-
tial to accommodate human rights, particularly, with the right 
to health.135  So far, there is very limited direction on the term 
“to protect” in WTO jurisprudence.  In European Communities–
Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (EC–Seals), the AB expounded on “to protect” to 
“impl[y] a particular focus on the protection from or against cer-
tain dangers or risks”136 thus, limiting it to an identifiable dan-
ger or risk.  There is no evidence of an agreed interpretation of 
the full scope of this term in the travaux préparatoires, nor is 
there any “evidence to suggest that the scope of this exception is 
limited to sanitary measures . . . .”137  It is clear that human 
health is a value that, as WTO adjudicators have concluded, is 
both vital and of the utmost importance.138  By signing the 
ICESCR, parties bound “themselves to respect, protect and ful-
fill economic, social and cultural rights” preceding human values 
“underlying the rights as fundamental—having priority over 
less fundamental, or secondary, human interests.”139  A right to 
health approach would thus give more specific definition to 
terms that are relatively vague.  
 
The CESCR expounded the normative content of the right 
to health in its General Comment 14.140  The right to health en-
tails an obligation to protect, which imposes positive duties on 
State Parties, for example, to adopt legislation or take other 
measures.141  It further requires State Parties:  
 
 
135 OHCHR, supra note 83, at 5. 
136 Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Prohibiting 
the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.197, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 16, 2014) [hereinafter EC–
Seal Products]. 
137 OHCHR, supra note 83, at 11. 
138 HOWSE & TEITEL, supra note 11, at 21. 
139 Id.; see generally U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., Fact 
Sheet No. 16 (Rev. 1), art. 2(3) (July 1991), https://www.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/Publications/FactSheet16rev.1en.pdf (“Most frequently, obligations are 
divided into ‘layers’ reflecting duties to (a) respect, (b) protect, (c) promote, and 
(d) fulfil each of the rights contained in the Covenant.”). 
140 General Comment No. 14, supra note 36, ¶ 6.  
141 Id. ¶ 35. 
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• To ensure equal access to healthcare and health-re-
lated services, whether provided by the public or pri-
vate healthcare sector;142  
• To ensure that medical professionals meet adequate 
standards of education, skills and ethical codes;143 
• To ensure that privatization of the healthcare sector 
does not jeopardize the availability, accessibility, ac-
ceptability and quality of healthcare facilities, goods 
and services;144  
• To control the trading of medical equipment and 
medicines by third parties;145 and  
• To ensure that third parties do not limit people’s ac-
cess to healthcare services.146  
 
 A right to health approach to interpreting “to protect” in 
GATS Article XIV(b) therefore suggests that the objective of the 
measures taken by Country X to ensure availability of medical 
practitioners and functioning public sector hospital services is 
“to protect” human life and health. 
2. Tier 2: The challenged measure is ‘necessary’ 
To pass the second-tier of the test, Country X would need to 
demonstrate that its public health measures meet all the re-
quirements of Article XIV(b), that is, that the non-complying 
measures are “necessary” to protect human life or health.147  The 
“necessity test,” developed through GATT XX(b) jurisprudence, 
was first applied by the Panel in the analysis of GATS Article 
XIV(c) in US–Gambling I.148  Whereas Members retain the right 
to regulate and pursue their policy objectives, a non-conforming 
measure is permissible only if it is “necessary” to achieve those 
 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. ¶ 41. 
146 Id. ¶ 35. 
147 See GATS, supra note 15, art. XIV(b). 
148 Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.536, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R 
(adopted Apr. 20, 2005).  
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policy objectives.149  The “necessity test” thus balances the free-
dom of Members to choose the measures to achieve the regula-
tory objectives they set with the overly trade restrictiveness of 
those measures.150  
 
The requirement that the public health measure must be 
“necessary” to protect “human life or health” entails interpreta-
tion of what is “necessary.”  To determine the necessity of a 
measure, “a panel must assess all the relevant factors,” includ-
ing the contribution made by the measure in achieving the policy 
objective, its trade restrictiveness, and possible less trade-re-
strictive alternatives.151  A comprehensive necessity analysis is 
a sequential process that “begins with an assessment of the ‘rel-
ative importance’ of the interests and values furthered by the 
challenged measure,” followed by “weighing and balancing” of all 
the relevant factors and, finally, comparing the challenged 
measure with possible less trade-restrictive alternatives.152  
 
The assessment of the relative importance of interests or 
values that underlie the challenged measure does not mean that 
the policy objective’s necessity is to be examined.153 Rather, it is 
the necessity of the measure to achieve the intended policy ob-
jective that is under examination.154  However, the more vital or 
important the interest that the challenged measure aims to pro-
tect, the easier it is for the measure to be accepted as neces-
sary.155  As noted earlier, GATT jurisprudence has acknowledged 
that the protection of human life or health is of vital 
 
149 Id. 
150 Working Party on Domestic Relations, Note by the Secretariat: “Neces-
sity Tests” in the WTO, ¶ 4, WTO Doc. S/WPDR/W/27 (Dec. 2, 2003) [hereinafter 
“Necessity Tests” in the WTO]. 
151 Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 122, ¶ 156.  
152 Appellate Body Report, China–Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, ¶ 242, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010) (quoting 
US–Gambling II, supra note 46, ¶¶ 306–07) [hereinafter China–Publications 
and Audiovisual Products]. 
153 “Necessity Tests” in the WTO, supra note 150, ¶ 12. 
154 Id. 
155 Appellate Body Report, Colombia–Measures Relating to the Importa-
tion of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear, ¶ 5.71, WTO Doc. WT/DS461/AB/R 
(adopted June 22, 2016) [hereinafter Colombia–Textiles]. 
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importance.156 
 
A right to health approach could further substantiate the 
challenged measure’s objective to protect human life or health 
with evidentiary value.157  According to the CESCR, the right to 
health entails “the following interrelated and essential ele-
ments[:]”158 
 
(a) “Availability [of] functioning public health and 
healthcare facilities, goods and services[;]”159  
(b) Accessibility of these health facilities, goods and services 
“must be within safe physical reach. . . [and] must be af-
fordable” for everyone without discriminating;160  
(c) “All health facilities, goods and services must be respect-
ful of medical ethics and culturally appropriate[;]”161 and  
(d) “[M]ust also be scientifically and medically appropriate 
and of good quality.”162  
 
As noted earlier, the right to health requires the State to 
provide a sufficiently functioning public healthcare system com-
prising not only of goods and services but also comprising of the 
healthcare personnel, the essential drugs, and the basic necessi-
ties of health, such as safe and potable drinking water and ade-
quate sanitation facilities.163  States must take all necessary 
steps to raise adequate revenue and mobilize resources for 
health, and, to that end, taxation, according to the UN Special 
Rapporteur, is “an instrument with which States may ensure ad-
equate funds are available for health through progressive fi-
nancing, as required under the right to health.” 164  Availability 
 
156 Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 122, ¶ 179. 
157 DIANA DESIERTO, PUBLIC POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE 
ICESCR IN TRADE, FINANCE, AND INVESTMENT 194 (2015). 
158 General Comment No. 14, supra note 36, ¶ 12. Although their precise 
nature will vary depending on the State party’s development level. Id. 
159 Id. ¶ 12(a). 
160 Id. ¶ 12(b). 
161 Id. ¶ 12(c). 
162 Id. ¶ 12(d). 
163 Id. ¶ 4. 
164 Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Everyone to the 
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, 
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of a sufficiently functioning public healthcare sector thus calls 
for an adequate number of medical staff as well as financial re-
sources to maintain the provision of good quality services to the 
populace.165  To the extent that the public health measures taken 
by Country X are grounded in those obligations, the differential 
tax measure, as well as the measure imposing quantitative re-
striction on the number of medical practitioners in the private 
sector, can be proven to be of vital importance to Country X. 
 
The contribution of the measure to achieve the objective 
pursued is the next step in the “holistic” weighing and balancing 
part of the necessity analysis.166  Here, again, a right to health 
approach forms the basis for scrutinizing the actual contribution 
of the challenged measure to the objective.167 Although not 
enough as a standalone component, “[t]he greater the contribu-
tion, the more easily a measure might be considered to be ‘nec-
essary.’”168  Therefore, in order to be necessary, a measure has 
“to make a material contribution to the achievement of its objec-
tive.”169  Contribution is determined through an assessment of 
the relationship “between the objective pursued and the meas-
ure at issue.”170  A trade restrictive measure may still be found 
to be necessary if it makes a “material contribution” to the 
achievement of its objective.171 
 
The Member seeking to prove that the challenged measure 
is necessary may submit evidence or data to establish that the 
contribution made by the measure is material.172  Depending on 
 
transmitted by Note from the Secretary-General, pt. III, § A(1), ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/67/302 (Aug. 13, 2012). 
165 MARJOLEIN DIELEMAN & JAN WILLEM HARNMEIJER, IMPROVING HEALTH 
WORKER PERFORMANCE: IN SEARCH OF PROMISING PRACTICES, WHO 2–3 (2006), 
https://www.who.int/hrh/resources/improving_hw_performance.pdf. 
166 DESIERTO, supra note 157, at 192. 
167 Id. at 194. 
168 Colombia–Textiles, supra note 155, ¶ 5.72 (quoting Appellate Body Re-
port, Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 
163, WTO Doc. WT/DS98/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2001)).  
169 EC–Seal Products, supra note 136, ¶ 5.213 (quoting Brazil–Retreaded 
Tyres, supra note 122, ¶ 150). 
170 Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 122, ¶ 210. 
171 Indonesia–Chicken, supra note 122, ¶ 7.227 (citing Brazil–Retreaded 
Tyres, supra note 122, ¶ 172; EC–Seal Products, supra note 136, ¶ 5.215). 
172 EC–Seal Products, supra note 136, ¶ 5.215. 
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the nature, quantity, and quality of the data, the Panel may con-
duct its analysis in either “quantitative or qualitative terms.”173  
The Panel’s reliance on scientific data in EC–Asbestos was justi-
fied by the AB, which further stressed that there is no require-
ment to quantify the risk under GATT Article XX and that the 
risk may be analyzed in quantitative or qualitative terms.174  A 
right to health discourse is useful for qualitative analysis as it 
provides the normative content to the DSBs to understand “the 
responding Member’s duties under the ICESCR [as well as] to 
map how the responding Member’s policy measures . . . [are] pro-
grammatically shaped and circumscribed by these [obliga-
tions.]”175  
 
Since the burden to prove that the challenged trade-restric-
tive measure is necessary rests with the responding Member, it 
would be insufficient for Country X to claim that its measures 
(i.e., differential tax measure as well as a quantitative re-
striction on healthcare professionals in the private sector) are 
aimed at fulfilling its right to health obligation.  Country X will 
need to substantiate its claim services with quantitative or qual-
itative evidence to showcase that its inconsistent measures un-
der GATS materially contributed to its public health objectives.  
The degree of contribution of the measure to achieve the objec-
tive must be clear.176  While “a panel must always assess the 
actual contribution made by the measure to the achievement of 
the objective pursued[,]”177 the contribution need not be “imme-
diately observable” and “could consist of quantitative projections 
in the future, or qualitative reasoning based on a set of hypoth-
eses that are tested and supported by sufficient evidence.”178  
“The Appellate Body in Brazil–Retreaded Tyres. . . assess[ed the 
necessity] of a measure that formed part of a broader policy 
scheme . . . that was not . . . likely [to have] an immediately dis-
cernible impact on its objective.”179  Yet, “[t]he Appellate Body 
 
173 Id.  
174 EC–Asbestos, supra note 65, ¶¶ 167–68. 
175 DESIERTO, supra note 157, at 195. 
176 Colombia–Textiles, supra note 155, ¶ 5.116. 
177 China–Publications and Audiovisual Products, supra note 152, ¶ 252. 
178 Id. ¶ 253 (quoting Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 122, ¶ 151). 
179 EC–Seal Products, supra note 136, ¶ 5.213; see also Brazil–Retreaded 
Tyres, supra note 122, ¶ 151, for the Appellate Body’s discussion regarding the 
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sought to determine whether the measure was ‘apt to make a 
material contribution’ to its objective . . . by assessing the extent 
to which it was apt to do so at some point in the future.”180  Fol-
lowing the CESCR interpretation, the right to health obligation 
requires Country X to have a well-functioning public healthcare 
system providing equal access to health facilities, goods, and ser-
vices.181  Thus, the contribution of the challenged measures may 
be indicative of the measure’s material contribution to the 
achievement of the health policy objective.  Because the ICESCR 
calls for a progressive realization of the right to health over a 
period of time,182 the contribution of the challenged measures 
may not be immediately apparent.  However, so long as they are 
accessible at some point in the future, Country X can claim that 
they make a material contribution in achieving its public health 
objectives.  
 
In addition, the Office of the UN High Commissioner recom-
mends that the DSBs may call upon human rights experts to 
ensure that human rights norms and standards are interpreted 
consistently, and to provide evidence that the challenged meas-
ure under the public health exception addresses the right to 
health.183  Since DSBs do not have expertise in human rights 
issues, seeking expert evidence from human rights treaty bodies 
would be useful to assess whether there is a genuine basis for 
the right to health argument raised in justification of the public 
health exception under GATS Article XIV(b).  Such an approach 
has already been taken in the Report of the Panel in Thailand–
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes 
(Thailand–Cigarettes), wherein WHO experts were consulted on 
the effects of smoking and whether Thailand’s import ban on for-
eign cigarettes was an appropriate response to tackle the health 
problem faced.184  Similarly, the comments and reports of the 
 
consideration of public health and environmental policy objectives. 
180 EC–Seal Products, supra note 136, ¶ 5.213 (quoting Brazil–Retreaded 
Tyres, supra note 122, ¶ 150). 
181 General Comment No. 14, supra note 36, ¶ 12. 
182 G.A. Res. 2200A–ICESCR, supra note 130, art. 2(1).  
183 OHCHR, supra note 83, at 15–16. 
184 Report of the Panel, Thailand–Restrictions on Importation of and In-
ternal Taxes on Cigarettes, ¶ 27, DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th 
Supp.), at 200 (1990) [hereinafter Thailand–Cigarettes]. 
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CESCR’s, particularly, General Comment 14, which elaborates 
and provides the normative content and the core minimum obli-
gation to ensure the satisfaction of minimum essential levels of 
the right to health under Article 12 of the IESCR,185 can be used 
as an expert doctrine for the interpretation of the right to health 
obligations of the responding Member.  It is important to note 
that the human rights expertise here is to assist the DSBs in 
assessing whether the challenged measure has a genuine under-
pinning in the right to health, that is, whether the measure 
could, in fact, be considered a bona fide measure in furtherance 
of the right to health and if so, whether it is necessary to achieve 
the stated health policy objective.186  What is more, the DSBs 
here are not determining whether the Member has violated its 
right to health obligation but “what is necessary in terms of re-
laxation of WTO disciplines for the Member to fulfill its duties 
under the ICESCR.”187  
 
Weighing and balancing exercises further entails an assess-
ment of trade restrictiveness of the challenged measure, which 
requires the panel to assess the degree of restrictions, not merely 
whether or not the measure involves some restrictions on 
trade.188  A “material contribution made by [a] measure” can still 
outweigh a trade restriction to the highest degree.189  However, 
there is no “pre-determined threshold” of materiality to ascer-
tain the contribution of the measure to the objective.190  Moreo-
ver, “a measure’s contribution is . . . only one component of the 
necessity calculus . . . mean[ing] that whether a measure is ‘nec-
essary’ cannot be determined by the level of contribution alone . 
. . .”191 
 
A measure cannot be justified as necessary “if an alternative 
measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and 
which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is 
 
185 General Comment No. 14, supra note 36, ¶¶ 7–29, 43–44.  
186 OHCHR, supra note 83, at 15–16. 
187 HOWSE & TEITEL, supra note 11, at 9. 
188 Colombia–Textiles, supra note 155, ¶¶ 5.73, 5.104. For an example of 
the Appellate Body’s application of this rule, see id. ¶¶ 5.95–5.117. 
189 Indonesia–Chicken, supra note 122, ¶ 7.227.   
190 EC–Seal Products, supra note 136, ¶ 5.213. 
191 Id. ¶ 5.215. 
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available to it.”192  The same reasoning applies to the examina-
tion of reasonably available, less trade-restrictive alternative 
measures in GATS Article XIV(B).193  The responding Member 
is not required to show that there are no reasonably available 
alternatives to achieve its objective.194  The burden to identify 
the alternative measure lies with the complaining party.195  To 
be reasonably available, an alternative measure has to be more 
than “merely theoretical in nature, for instance, where the re-
sponding Member is not capable of taking it . . . .”196  Although 
such alternative measure may involve “some change or adminis-
trative cost,” it should not impose an “undue burden” unless 
“prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties” are im-
posed on the responding Member.197  
 
Since the responding Member has a right to choose the level 
of health protection it deems appropriate, a less trade-restrictive 
alternative measure is not reasonably available if it does not 
meaningfully contribute to achieving the party’s desired level of 
protection.198  Therefore, it is not for Country X to show that 
there are no reasonably available alternatives that would 
achieve its objectives; and additionally, not only must any alter-
native be both practically and financially feasible, but it must 
also provide an equivalent contribution to the achievement of its 
health policy objectives fulfilling its right to health obligation.199 
 
In a nutshell, for public health measures of Country X to be 
considered “necessary” to achieve the health policy objectives as 
 
192 Thailand–Cigarettes, supra note 184, ¶ 74 (quoting Report of the 
Panel, United States–Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439 (Jan. 16, 
1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.), at 345, ¶ 5.26 (1989)). 
193 See Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 122, at ¶ 7.152. 
194 E.g., id. ¶ 5.149. 
195 E.g., id. 
196 US–Gambling II, supra note 46, ¶ 308.  
197 China–Publications and Audiovisual Products, supra note 152, ¶¶ 318, 
327 (quoting US–Gambling II, supra note 46, ¶ 308). However, it is for the 
responding Member to establish that the alternative measure would impose an 
undue burden on it. Id. ¶ 327 (citing US–Gambling II, supra note 46, ¶ 308). 
198 See EC–Seal Products, supra note 136, ¶ 5.279.  
199 See id. ¶ 5.723 (“[A] responding Member cannot be expected to accept 
an alternative measure that makes less of a contribution to its objective than 
the challenged measure.”). 
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identified under GATS Article XIV(b), the contribution of those 
measures has to be weighed against their trade restrictiveness, 
taking into account the importance of the interests or the values 
underlying the objective pursued by them, and be assessed 
against any reasonably available, less trade-restrictive alterna-
tive measure.  The foregoing analysis establishes how a right to 
health approach can assist the DSBs in defining “to protect,” de-
termining “relative importance” of the interests or values, as-
sessing the “appropriateness” of the level of the health protec-
tion, and the contribution of the public health measures 
undertaken by Country X.  
3. Tier 3: Chapeau of article xiv and good faith 
The third and final analytical step to satisfy the require-
ments of GATS Article XIV(b) is to prove that the challenged 
measures meet all the requirements contained in the introduc-
tory paragraph—also known as the chapeau—of Article XIV.200  
The chapeau of Article XIV (which is substantially identical to 
the chapeau of GATT Article XX) requires that the impugned 
measures “are not applied in a manner which would constitute 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on trade in services.”201  The chapeau aims to prevent the abuse 
of the exceptions by ensuring that a Member exercising its right 
under the exception does not “frustrate the rights accorded” un-
der GATS to the other Members.202  The AB made clear in US–
Gasoline II that the chapeau focuses on the manner in which the 
measure is applied and not on the content thereof.203 
 
The central question the chapeau raises is whether the non-
compliant measures have been “applied reasonably, with due re-
gard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception 
and the legal rights of the other parties concerned.”204  The bur-
den to prove that it has not abused its right under the exception 
 
200 Fidler et al., supra note 2, ¶ 470. 
201 Id. 
202 US–Gambling II, supra note 46, ¶ 339. 
203 US–Gasoline II, supra note 115, at 22. 
204 Id. 
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lies with the State invoking it.205  The doctrine of abus de droit,206 
which prohibits the abusive exercise of a State’s rights, has been 
applied by the AB in US–Shrimps as a good faith principle in the 
reading of chapeau of GATT Article XX.207  The requirement that 
a measure must not be applied arbitrarily or unjustifiably is 
thus an obligation on the WTO Members to act in good faith.208 
 
Despite the lack of a definition in positive terms, most com-
mentators concede that “[t]he principle of good faith has a great 
deal of normative appeal” and is a well-accepted fundamental 
norm in many domestic and international legal systems.209  Alt-
hough not a source of obligation in itself where none would ex-
ist,210 the concept of good faith is “[o]ne of the basic principles 
governing the creation and performance of legal obligations . . . 
.”211  The principle of good faith is also incorporated in VCLT 
Article 26—the Pacta Sunt Servanda—which obligates the par-
ties to a treaty to perform the same in good faith.212  The ICJ 
affirmed the obligation to act in good faith as “a general principle 
of law” and also as “a part of international law.”213  The AB sim-
ilarly identified good faith as “at once a general principle of law 
and a principle of general international law.”214  Good faith plays 
an important role in WTO law, on different levels and under dif-
ferent guises.215 
 
 
205 Id. at 22–23. 
206 A French term, meaning “abuse of right.” Abus de droit Law and Legal 
Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/a/abus-de-droit/ (last vis-
ited Dec. 8, 2020). 
207 US–Shrimps, supra note 118, ¶¶ 38, 158. 
208 Id. ¶ 158. 
209 Andrew D. Mitchell, Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, 7 MELB. 
J. INT’L L. 339, 340 (2006). 
210 Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 
1988 I.C.J. 69, ¶ 94  (Dec. 20). 
211 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 46 (Dec. 20).    
212 VCLT, supra note 82, art. 26. 
213 Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9, 34, at 
53 (July 6) (separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J.). 
214 US–Shrimps, supra note 118, ¶ 158. 
215 See, for example, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights arts. 24.4, 24.5, 48.2, 58, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 
which explicitly mention good faith.  
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In its application of good faith, WTO jurisprudence has 
made references to Pacta Sunt Servanda in a number of cases.216  
Not only has the AB viewed “good faith [as] . . . an ‘organic’ and 
‘pervasive’ general principle . . . that underlies all treaties,” but 
in several decisions the AB panel presumed good faith, corre-
sponding to the traditional understanding of good faith in gen-
eral international law.217  This principle includes a “general ob-
ligation” on the State parties to a treaty to perform that treaty 
in good faith, that is, “to refrain from acts which would defeat 
the object and purpose of a treaty to which they are members . . 
. .”218  The good faith requirement in the chapeau calls for the 
public health measures of Country X (even though necessary to 
protect human life or health), to be applied in a non-arbitrary 
manner, not discriminating between trade partners and, above 
all, not to be a disguised restriction on trade in services.219  It is 
easier for a public health measure grounded in the right to 
health obligation to pass the scrutiny of the chapeau if the objec-
tive to fulfill the right to health obligation is not used to guise 
trade protectionism.  Even if the public health measures fail to 
pass the test laid out in the chapeau, it does not mean that the 
measures are not necessary to achieve the right to health objec-
tives, but only that Country X will have to apply the measures 
in a consistent and non-discriminatory manner. 
 
Finally, the principle of good faith not only requires the 
Members to apply the measures in good faith but also serves as 
a mechanism of accountability of the treaty interpreter.220  
VCLT Article 31(1) calls for interpretation in good faith, estab-
lishing a general standard of behavior for treaty interpreters by 
 
216 US–Shrimps, supra note 118, ¶ 38; Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 278, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002); Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 296, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2003). 
217 Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, ‘Good Faith’ in the WTO Jurisprudence–Nec-
essary Balancing Element or an Open Door to Judicial Activism?, 8 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 721, 724 (2005). 
218 Id. at 730. 
219 Id. at 733 n.212. 
220 Eric De Brabandere & Isabelle Van Damme, Good Faith in Treaty In-
terpretation, in GOOD FAITH AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 37 (Andrew D. 
Mitchell, M. Sornarajah, & Tania Voon eds., 2015). 
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requiring that they act reasonably and fairly.221  The principle of 
good faith can thus help the interpreters to justify choices in ap-
plying articles 31(3)(c) of the VCLT,222 and take into account the 
right to health raised by Country X in assessing the justification 
of its measures inconsistent with the provisions of GATS.  A good 
faith interpretation of GATS Article XIV(b), consistent with the 
notion of systemic interpretation,223 accommodates the applica-
tion of the right to health as an interpretive as well as an evi-
dentiary tool as the discussion above has demonstrated.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper set out to demonstrate how a right to health ap-
proach in the interpretation of the public health exception in 
GATS Article XIV(b) can bring about a harmonious application 
of international human rights and international trade law re-
gimes, which have long evolved in isolation.  The paper raised 
the argument from the perspective of a WTO Member that is 
also a State Party to ICESCR.  It addressed whether a WTO 
Member that has committed itself to fully liberalize all the ser-
vices sectors having implications for health (such as hospital and 
other healthcare services, environmental services, and profes-
sional services) still retains the regulatory space to undertake 
measures to fulfill its right to health obligations.  The foregoing 
analysis has expounded how such a Member can justify a public 
health measure as incompatible with GATS obligations when 
undertaken to fulfill its right to health obligation through rais-
ing the public health exception in GATS Article XIV(b).  
 
First of all, not every public health measure affecting inter-
national trade in services is necessarily inconsistent with the 
GATS obligations.  However, if a public health measure is chal-
lenged by another Member for violating the GATS obligations, 
the responding Member can justify its measure as necessary to 
 
221 Id. at 38. 
222 Id. at 38–39.  
223 See generally Van Damme, supra note 119, at 624–25, 632–33, 622 
n.147, for a discussion on the principal of harmonization, which requires a 
treaty to be read in harmony and consistently within the broader context of 
international customary treaty law; and EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY 
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 63–74 (2014), for an evolutionary interpretation 
on good faith.  
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protect human life or health.  In doing so, the responding Mem-
ber will need to prove that its public health measures are not 
arbitrary trade-restrictive measures in disguise, and are, in fact, 
necessary to achieve its policy objectives that aim to protect hu-
man life or health.  This paper argued that, in its defense, the 
responding Member can raise its right to health obligation to 
prove:   
 
• That a public health measure is a vital and im-
portant health policy objective under GATS Article 
XIV(b); 
• That a right to health approach can assist the DSBs 
to interpret seemingly vague terms such as “to pro-
tect” by providing a wider normative environment as 
well as specificity; 
• That in determining “necessity” of the challenged 
measure, the right to health approach can provide 
evidentiary value in assessing the “material” contri-
bution of the measure to the achievement of the 
health policy objective, to which end the acknowl-
edged human rights experts may also be called to 
provide evidence that the challenged measure ful-
filled the right to health requirement; and  
• That a public health measure to fulfill a right to 
health obligation has better chances of passing the 
test in the chapeau of GATS Article XIV if the re-
sponding State can prove that its measure shows a 
good faith application of the right to health and is not 
a discriminatory and disguised trade restriction.  
 
The analysis in this paper has also provided WTO Members 
with potential legal strategies to strengthen their defense if 
their public health measures undertaken to fulfill their right to 
health duties are challenged under GATS.  Having a better un-
derstanding of the international legal framework that GATS and 
related rules of public international law create will allow the 
WTO Members to respond better to their public health needs by 
utilizing the flexibilities, regulatory space, as well as the limita-
tions and exceptions provided within GATS.  
 
Lastly, a right to health approach to the interpretation of 
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the public health exception furthers, through systemic integra-
tion, the compatibility of the two regimes.  Although a Member 
cannot justify the measure as inconsistent with its GATS obliga-
tions solely on the basis of the right to health, the right to health 
approach can assist the DSBs in defining concepts, determining 
the necessity of health policy objectives, and assessing the con-
tribution of the measure towards the achievement of the health 
policy objectives.  Some scholars caution that such an “extreme . 
. . approach could lead to the modification of the treaty.”224   
 
It is worth noting that the human rights approach to the 
interpretation of the general exception in WTO treaties does not 
mean that these exceptions are interpreted through direct appli-
cation of the human rights treaties.  As demonstrated in this pa-
per, the right to health approach does not require the DSBs to 
determine whether or not the Member has violated its right to 
health obligation but whether it is necessary to relax the GATS 
disciplines for the Member to fulfill its right to health obligation.  
Furthermore, the application of the right to health as an eviden-
tiary and interpretive tool through VCLT Article 31(3)(c) does 
not add anything to GATS Article XIV(b) but constructs its 
meaning through a legal technique that takes into account wider 
normative context.  A right to health approach will not only re-
inforce the intention of the parties that remained in the text but 
also develop complementarity between the two regimes and ad-
dress in part fragmentation of public international law.  
 
224 Sorel & Boré Eveno, supra note 114, at 826. 
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